concepts

Political power supposes a socially distributed attitude to concepts. Concepts conform the entire domain of knowledge and, unless a plane of construction deployed, remain replications, often partial or inaccurate, on a plain of consistence. Attitudes introduce the mind back to the realm of mindless replications, of langue, by relating these concepts to physiological and emotional reactions.(1) The power of a concept like ‘nation’ does not consist only in being a central node whose inervation would require from a profound shift in the adjacent regulations and implications among concepts, but in its attachment to a series of sentiments, arousals, emotions, that allows it to produce and reinforce the otherwise casual, abstract, general but detached, plain of consistence. This character operates as a localized adhesive to the purely eidetical, disembodied, logical system.

(1)This system of implication is isomorph to a neural network. The centrality of concepts to a reinforced associative net of neurons, the cogency to its activation of areas related to motor, physiological, emotional, response that coney a certain automaticity but that also purvey with the actual feeling of an embodied mind. The noetic space implies both aspects of this system: consistence and cogency, the grounds of power. By power potestas is alluded rather than mere force, vis.