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Hobbes envisaged a cognitive theory of vision, according to which we err because we have false impressions.(1) The boundaries between perception and cognition are blurred. Thus imagination, an active product of the mind, is but the remaining conception produced by a ‘decaying sense’, an obscure image, unable to produce a clear impression.(2)
This mist between senses and representation had another major implication: qualities are inherent to the subject, not to the object. The quantitative measure bounded reality to the language of mathematics, the qualitative aspect of experience is referred to the patient of its effect. Qualities are the byproduct of the action bodies exert upon our senses, they are perceived in the interaction with our particular and characteristic physiology.(3) Hobbes addressed the topic in a fashion similar to the Greek Sophists, sensations are deemed to be particular to every single human being.(4) The solution to the problem of sense perception was diametrically opposed to any objective stance, curiously enough Hobbes unravels this difficulty by means of the senses again. Thus ends their review in his early The Elements of Law:

And from thence also it followeth, that whatsoever accidents or qualities our senses make us think there be in the world, they are not there, but are seemings and apparitions only. The things that really are in the world without us, are those motions by which these seemings are caused. And this is the great deception of sense, which also is by sense to be corrected. For as sense telleth me, when I see directly, that the colour seemeth to be in the object; so also sense telleth me, when I see by reflection, that colour is not in the object.(5)

The traditional deception of the senses was not to be corrected by reason or by the submission to a different instance like authority, but rather by a new perceptual appreciation, recovering Galileo’s stress on pure, unprejudiced, observation. Knowledge was related to sensation, neither to accepted wisdom nor to individual reason.

Cartesian_Vision

(1) “Fools and madmen manifestly deliberate no less than the wisest men, though they make not so good a choice, the images of things being by diseases altered.” The Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity and Chance, VIII, p. 80.
(2) “An obscure conception is that which representeth the whole object together, but none of the smaller parts by themselves; and as more or fewer parts be represented, so is the conception or representation said to be more or less clear.” Elements of Law, I, 3, 7.
(3) “That image and colour is but an apparition unto us of that motion, agitation, or alteration, which the object worketh in the brain, or spirits, or some internal substance in the head,” Elements of Law, I, 7 in fine.
(4) “And to proceed to the rest of the senses, it is apparent enough, that the smell and taste of the same thing, are not the same to every man, and therefore are not in the thing smelt or tasted, but in the men.” Elements of Law, I, 2, 9.
(5) Elements of Law, I, 2, 10.

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Background knowledge is highly important in our conceptualization and in the formation of new categories.1 Concepts are nested both in our perception and in our actions, they somehow become incorporated attitudes.2 They sustain situated action, the activity immanent to a plain of consistence. But a concept can be adopted in a wide array of situated conceptualizations and may therefore have a variable representation.3 A central model predefines the conditions of an amplified model but remains inaccessible to change due to its abstract, superordinate, character which does not permit an alteration by means of experience in a somatosensorial form, thus remaining attached to our direct experience but inalterable.4 A connectionist model of learning supposes the formation of nodes of information that become more robust and, simultaneously, more inaccessible, achieving a higher level in the cognitive hierarchy, becoming, in a sense, a prioris to knowledge.5 Still, a certain resemblance can enhance the categorization of a novel concept as long as there is a minimal information able to connect the new object to the given knowledge.6

A contemporary example of such a structural-cognitive model that becomes ubiquous is the metaphor of a network.7 It has been applied both to the tendencies of capital delocalization, the embeddedment of large multinationals within sovereign states, and also to an understanding of man that relies on, on the one hand, the developments in cognitive science and the models of parallel distributed processing of information, in the functioning of a decentralized body-brain system, and by asserting the variably scattered, extended, character of personality.8

1 B.H. Ross, “Remindings and their effects in learning a cognitive skill”, Cognitive Psychology, 16, 1984, pp. 371-416.
2 Cf. G.L. Murphy, The Big Book of Concepts, Massachusetts, 2002. D.L. Medin, “Concepts and conceptual structure”, American Psychologist 44, 1989, pp. 1469–1481. M. Morris and G. L. Murphy, “Converging operations on a basic level in event taxonomies”, Memory and Cognition 18, 1990, pp. 407–418. L.A. Hirschfeld and S. A. Gelman (eds.) Mapping the Mind: Domain Specificity in Cognition and Culture, New York, 1994.
3 L.W. Barsalou, “Situated Conceptualization”, H. Cohen and C. Lefebvre (eds.), Handbook of categorization in cognitive sciences, Saint Louis, 2005.
4 G. Lakoff, Women, Fire and Dangerous Things
5 Cf. J.K. Kruschke, “ALCOVE: An exemplar-based connectionist model of category learning”, Psychological Review, 99, 1992, pp. 22-44.
6 A.S. Kaplan and G.L. Murphy, “Category learning with minimal prior knowledge”, Journal of Experimental.
7 A.S. Kaplan and G.L. Murphy, “Category learning with minimal prior knowledge”, Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Leaning, Memory and Cognition, 26(4), 2000, pp. 829-46. Cf. E.M. Pothos and N. Charter, “A simplicity principle in unsupervised human categorization”, Cognitive Science, 26, 2002, pp. 303-43.
8 Cf. M. Castells, The rise of the network society (3 vols.), Oxford, 2000 ff.

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Rather than understanding knowledge as a simple ‘thing’, as a product, the history of ideas grasps knowledge as a process of co-creation, of concoction, and also co-action. In this process a common space,(1) an orography, can be traced, conveyed, in a shared language, by means of language games, despite imperfect, partial, replications. To share a noetic space, it does not suffice to attain a certain semantic competence; it also requires to be embedded in a soil of interactions forged by relations of meaning. Men produce their conditions of existence by translating, by incorporating, their conventions, by the deposition of uncertainty in discourse.

Jasper Johns

In this sense, knowledge can be seen as a mental space shared and lived together by the members of a given community, founded on the sedimentation and hstorical dispersion of language. The sense of community shapes the very content of this space, not only limited to the speaker of that community, but also by those whose space, due to its imported/exported similarity, are able to integrate, at least partially, those nuances. What matters is not the term but the general noetic space.

(1) Cf. G. Fauconnier, Mental Spaces, New York, 1994.

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