Lebensform

According to post-structuralist claims, epistemological changes depend on a certain mutation within a cadre of ideas, whose transformations imply general changes in other areas of that structure: structures are stable, though transformational, figures. The weakness of this position relies on the quasi-ontological character of structures, how do they present themselves in the mind of the observer? Cognition allows us to discern the conditions of possibility of certain social thought-structures, their expansion and their evolution, as embodied ideas. Cognitive science and mental models also point to an understanding of the spread and evolution of ideas embedded in a mental structure. Hence, it is the mental structure and not an ontological order of being the ground for change. Men create the conditions of existence of ideas by being provided with a schema that can integrate them. Still, we can always find inconsistencies in a set of believes, they prepare the ground to new mutations that might achieve a novel consistency, coherence, and coercion. Wittgenstein referred to this consistency as a Lebensform, related to a language game, to a wider system of relations than those presupposed in a mere system of signs.1 A Lebensform conveys both social practices and discourses, categories, on the other hand, highlight both their cognitive content and the implied readiness to action.

1 “Richtig und falsch ist was Menschen sagen; und in der Sprache stimmen die Menschen überein. Dies ist keine Übereinstimmung der Meinungen, sondern der Lebensform.” L. Wittgenstein, Nachlass, Oxford, 2000, Item 227a, p. 159. Ibid. Item 235, p. 8. “…der Ausdruck der Gedanken, die Sprache, ist den Menschen gemainsam. Es ist eine Lebensform in der sie übereinstimmen (nicht eine Meinung).” L. Wittgenstein, Nachlass, Item 124, p. 213.